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  An industry group has proposed a novel system for managing the Northeast Multispecies Fish-
ery. Each harvester would be endowed with a budget of points, and each species would have a 
“point price,” or number of points that must be paid out of his budget when landing that spe-
cies. By varying the point prices throughout the season, management could redirect effort 
across species. This paper presents a benchmarked experimental testbed of this management 
system, and shows that harvesters do respond to point prices, which can be chosen to support 
harvest of most of the allowable catch of each species without severely over-harvesting any of 
them. 
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The Northeast Multispecies Fishery has proven to 
be a particularly challenging management prob-
lem.
1 It consists of 15 jointly harvested ground-
fish species, in 19 stocks, distributed over a large 
area and pursued by highly heterogeneous har-
vesters, with varying ports, vessel size, gear type, 
and preferred target species. Many of the stocks, 
including some economically valuable ones, are 
abundant, but other stocks are badly depressed. 
The fishery is currently (until May 2010) man-
aged by a system of transferable days at sea, 
                                                                                    
Christopher Anderson is Associate Professor in the Department of En-
vironmental and Natural Resource Economics at the University of 
Rhode Island in Kingston, Rhode Island. 
The author is grateful to Eric Thunberg of the Northeast Fisheries 
Science Center for support in developing the experimental environ-
ment, to James Nugent for software development, and to Robert Griffin 
for research assistance. This work was supported by NOAA Fisheries 
Award No. NFFM7330-7-16151.  
This paper was presented as a selected paper at the workshop “The 
Use of Experimental Methods in Environmental, Natural Resource, 
and Agricultural Economics,” organized by the Northeastern Agricul-
tural and Resource Economics Association (NAREA) in Burlington, 
Vermont, June 9–10, 2009. The workshop received financial support 
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the USDA Economic 
Research Service, and the Farm Foundation. The views expressed in 
this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the policies 
or views of the sponsoring agencies. 
 
1 See the New England Fishery Management Council’s “Northeast 
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan” at http://www.nefmc.org/ 
nemulti/index.html for more information about the fishery, which is 
constantly evolving. 
which constrains how much time vessels may 
spend harvesting, combined with daily trip limits 
for certain species. Harvesters find this system 
unsatisfactory because the allocations of days at 
sea are limited by the most depressed stocks, 
meaning that harvesters are not allotted time to 
harvest much of the biologically determined total 
allowable catches (TACs) of many of the most 
valuable stocks. As a result, industry and regula-
tors are interested in identifying alternative man-
agement systems that are politically feasible
2 and 
provide better opportunity for harvesters to profit 
from abundant stocks, while allowing recovery of 
depressed stocks. 
  One novel approach has been developed by the 
Northeast Seafood Coalition (2006). Rather than 
an initial allocation of quota shares in each of the 
stocks, this so-called “Points System Proposal” 
would establish an initial allocation of “points” to 
each harvester. Although this initial allocation 
would be based on landings history, individuals 
would not be granted an access privilege to any 
particular amount of any species of fish. Instead, 
the points system proposes to assign a “biological 
                                                                                    
2 This fishery has been historically managed by input regulation, and 
harvesters are united against any quota-based system. While individual 
transferable quotas may best achieve management goals, the manage-
ment challenge here is to identify a non-quota system that does nearly 
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point value” (BPV) to each of the stocks and fish-
ermen would “spend” their points based on what 
they catch. In this manner, a weak stock with a 
low  TAC  would be assigned a higher (perhaps 
much higher) BPV than a rebuilt stock or one that 
has a higher TAC; this would encourage harvest-
ers to focus their effort on stocks that cost fewer 
points.
3 As proposed, the BPV would be adjusted 
periodically in response to current harvest activity 
and stock abundance to assure that TACs would 
not be exceeded. This system would operate 
much like the Federal Reserve’s overnight lend-
ing rate policy, wherein a regulatory authority can 
control the actions of agents in an economy by 
continuously adjusting key price ratios, thus al-
tering behavioral incentives. 
  From an economic perspective, the points sys-
tem has some of the same desirable features asso-
ciated with individual transferable quota (ITQ) 
programs (Arnason 2002). Specifically, fisher-
men would have an incentive to maximize the 
value of their allocated points instead of maxi-
mizing catch. Further, it creates an interest in the 
longer-term health of the resource to increase the 
value of the allocation. The industry also feels 
that the points system also offers some economic 
flexibility that an ITQ would not. Under an ITQ 
system, individual harvesters would need to enter 
the quota market to obtain the desired portfolio of 
quota for the fishing season. Changing the port-
folio to match realized catch would require the 
harvester to go back to the quota market and incur 
the potentially high transaction costs of acquiring 
or selling quota to achieve the correct balance of 
the 19 quota instruments. The points system 
would reduce these transaction costs and would 
afford harvesters greater flexibility to adjust busi-
ness planning on an annual or in-season basis. 
  This paper implements an experimental proof-
of-concept testbed for the points system that 
evaluates whether, even in a simplified environ-
ment, periodic point price adjustments can be 
identified—and whether harvesters have suffi-
cient control over their harvests to respond si-
multaneously to market and point prices—to sup-
port fishing choices that harvest a significant por-
                                                                                    
3 “Biological point value” is the language of the proposal, though in 
reality abundance is only one factor that will determine point prices 
that effectively manage effort across species. A high point price may 
not be necessary to discourage harvest of a species if it yields low 
profits, or a high point price may be needed to reduce harvest of even 
an abundant species if it is highly profitable. 
tion of the TAC of abundant species, without 
badly over-harvesting depressed stocks. This will 
complement Truong, Jiao, and Azadivar’s (2006) 
computer simulation of the effect of the program 
on stock levels. 
  The experimental treatment addresses two con-
cerns raised by the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) Multispecies 
Plan Development Team (PDT) in assessing the 
points system: that harvesters might discard spe-
cies that yielded low profit per point, not wanting 
to spend their points on low value species; and 
that incorrect point prices might induce derbies. 
That is, seeing an underpriced species, harvesters 
may race to target it, and catch very high volumes 
before the price can be corrected. This sort of 
derby can decrease fishery profits in two ways. 
First, the rapid pursuit of fish with a high ratio of 
market price to point price can induce harvesters 
to spend more money in pursuit of underpriced 
species, traveling to distant fishing grounds, or 
investing in larger vessels, to more fully exploit 
this species before its point price goes up. Sec-
ond, in so doing, they may meet or exceed the an-
nual TAC for that species before the price can be 
adjusted. In this case, the point price after the 
adjustment will rise dramatically. This can leave 
the market with a very low supply of the initially 
underpriced species for the balance of the season, 
and make effectively off-limits still-available fish 
stocks that are often jointly harvested with the ini-
tially underpriced species. 
  Similar experiments have been used to evaluate 
other proposed fishery management measures. 
The North Pacific Fisheries Management Council 
used an experiment to evaluate arbitration rules 
between harvesters and processors in the Bering 
Sea/Aleutian Island crab rationalization (North 
Pacific Fishery Management Council 2003). The 
New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries used experi-
ments to support its choice of auctions for resid-
ual quota for new species (Anderson and Holland 
2006), and experiments have been used to de-
velop an understanding of price formation under 
alternative rules of trade in transferable allowance 
markets (Anderson 2004, Anderson and Sutinen 
2005, 2006). This paper expands on those pro-
jects by examining harvesting strategies, rather 
than market mechanisms that have been the focus 
of previous work. 
  The next section describes the experimental de-
sign and treatment parameter sets. The price ad-Anderson  An Experimental Analysis of a Points-Based System for Managing Multispecies Fisheries   229 
 
 
justment rule developed for the experiment is 
then explained. The section after that presents the 
experimental results, focusing first on harvesting 
choices and TAC exploitation, and then on indi-
vidual responsiveness to point prices. The final 
section concludes with implications for imple-
menting the points system. 
 
The Experimental Environment 
 
The hypotheses to be tested concern how harvest-
ers alter their catch composition in response to 
changing ratios between the profitability and 
point prices of landing different species. The ex-
periment captures this by asking subjects to choose 
among a set of “locations,” each of which has a 
different composition of three “species.”
4 In the 
“no discarding” treatment, subjects land every-
thing they catch, but in the “discarding” treat-
ment, subjects can choose to land a subset of their 
catch. Subjects earn money for participating in 
the experiments, and the amount they earn is pro-
portional to the profits they earn from fishing. 
  In each experimental session, groups of 8 or 9 
subjects share a set of four fishing locations, and 
have the option to stay home. On each day of a 
10-day fishing season, each subject chooses a 
location to fish. Each subject has a cost (i.e., 
travel cost) associated with each location. When a 
subject chooses a location, she pays the associ-
ated costs and “catches” a random draw of three 
species of fish from that location; subjects are 
provided expected catch information for each 
location. The subject sells her landings to the ex-
perimenter at the market price posted for each 
species. (In the discard treatment, subjects can 
choose which subset of catch they wish to land, 
discarding the rest.) She keeps her revenue from 
selling landings, less the location-specific cost, as 
profit. 
  To implement the points system in this simu-
lated fishery, subjects begin each season with an 
endowment of points. Each species has a posted 
total allowable catch (TAC) that is explained to 
subjects as “a harvest goal for that species... [that] 
represents fish that can be landed safely, without 
harming the fishery.” The point price for each 
                                                                                    
4 Locations within the experiment reflect variations in species com-
position and non-target catch rates, thus capturing not only geographic 
location, but also gear-setting techniques and depth choices made by 
harvesters in the field. 
species represents the number of points that must 
be redeemed for each pound of that species 
landed. Initial point prices are determined by the 
parameter set used, and subjects are told that the 
point price will change after the fifth day of the 
season. Specifically, the instructions describe the 
basis for changing point prices: 
 
Point prices will change to encourage choosing locations 
that will come closest to reaching the TACs for all spe-
cies. This means that if, in the first 5 days, all species are 
approaching their TACs at the same rate, it is likely that 
relative point prices will not change very much, but if 
one is approaching its TAC much faster than others, its 
relative point price will increase. 
 
To help subjects track the effect of the group’s 
harvesting on likely future point prices, the cu-
mulative landings of each species, and remaining 
TAC, are posted at the end of each day. 
  Figure 1 shows the subject interface for the dis-
carding treatment; the no discarding treatment is 
similar. Locations are arrayed across the upper 
section of the screen, and provide information on 
the cost, expected catch, expected points redeemed, 
and expected revenue associated with that loca-
tion. The lower part of the screen provides infor-
mation on the fishery, including the TAC and 
cumulative landings of each species; the market, 
including the price for landings and the point 
prices associated with each species; and the sub-
ject’s “boat,” which reflects the subject’s landings 
and tracks individual profits. 
  When a subject clicks on a location, a pop-up 
box notifies her of her catch, and in the discard 
treatment gives her the option of choosing how 
much of her catch of each species she would like 
to land.
5 In the event that a subject does not have 
enough points to cover her catch, her catch of all 
species is scaled proportionately to exhaust her 
points. In the discard treatment, she can adjust 





Testing the specific hypotheses about discarding 
and price-induced derbies will require treatments 
                                                                                    
5 To avoid associating any ethical value to discarding, in the discard-
ing treatment subjects were told simply that they could choose to “land 
none, some or all of your catch of each species,” and that landings de-
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with different relationships among initial stock 
abundance, market prices, and initial point prices. 
Derbies should be most likely when some species 
are initially significantly undervalued, and dis-
carding should be most likely when some species 
are relatively expensive. Thus, we must define a 
set of alternative locations and parameter sets of 
TACs and initial point prices in which this range 
of outcomes is predicted. The five available loca-
tions are described in Table 1.
6 
  The top section of the table shows the average 
pounds of each species caught in each location. 
The primary tension leveraged in the experimen-
tal design is that between the profitability advan-
tage of D, and tight TACs on green fish that make 
B the optimal choice. When subjects select a lo-
cation, they receive a random draw from 100 ac-
tual fishing trips taken from logbook data, where 
each area corresponds to a region of the Northeast 
multispecies fishery.
7 Because the actual harvests 
are highly variable, so too are the subjects’ har-
vests. Subjects were told there would be consid-
erable variation because their harvests would be 
based on actual trips, but we did not provide them 
with variance-covariance matrix information for 
each location. 
  The four parameter sets described in Table 2 
test the extent to which choice behavior can be 
controlled by adjusting point prices. They are 
named to reflect the optimal location choice pat-
tern. Set D is determined by multiplying the ex-
pected catch at D by eight days times the number 
of subjects to get the TAC, and choosing point 
prices such that D is optimal, and multiplying 
point prices by the expected catch times eight 
periods to get point endowments. Set B is deter-
mined similarly, but with location B, which has 
far fewer green fish. Sets BD and DB have TACs 
set by multiplying the expected catch at each lo-
cation by four times the number of subjects. Set 
BD has initial point prices so that location B is 
optimal, and has an expected set of changed point 
prices that support location D and serve as a basis 
for determining point endowments. Set DB sets 
                                                                                    
6 Expected harvests do not vary with current or previous location 
choices of other subjects, reflecting that TACs are a small portion of 
overall biomass and that the species being modeled are schooling, so 
incremental stock depletion does not diminish catchability. 
7 Blue fish are haddock, green fish are yellowtail flounder, and red 
fish are cod. Location A corresponds to Inshore George’s Bank, B to 
Mid-George’s Bank, C to Inshore Gulf of Maine (South), and D to Off-
shore George’s Bank. 
the point price of green low enough that D is 
tempting, though it leads to possible inefficiency. 
  Note that for BD and DB, the efficient harvest 
levels are such that four periods of D and four 
periods of B achieve harvest efficiency regardless 
of the order in which those locations are visited. 
Thus, if all subjects initially target D four times in 
set BD, for example, they will simply be going 
into the second half of the season with fewer 
points than anticipated. The point price adjust-
ment algorithm will select relative point prices so 
that the optimal choice is B, but will scale the 
point prices to a lower level, taking into account 
the smaller number of outstanding point balances. 
Inefficiency can still arise in two ways. First, the 
potential for inefficiency arises when some sub-
jects get the order wrong but others do not. The 
subjects who adopt less point intensive strategies 
(choosing location B in this example) will have a 
greater share of the outstanding points after the 
point price change, and thus will have greater 
flexibility in selecting the most profitable loca-
tions a greater number of times after the change. 
Second, enough harvesters could select D in all 
five initial days, leaving an insufficient quantity 
of the green TAC available for the price adjust-
ment algorithm’s new price to select four harvests 
at B as the optimum outcome, and thus the re-
sulting point prices could lead to inefficient total 
harvest. 
  In each experimental session, subjects partici-
pated in eight 10-day fishing seasons. The pa-
rameter sets were presented in order of increasing 
strategic complexity, so subjects first played with 
parameter set D, then D a second time, then B in 
seasons 3 and 4, BD in seasons 5 and 6, and DB 




Price Adjustment Model 
 
Since revising point prices is a key element of the 
points system proposal, and is key to the behav-
ioral incentives being tested in the present study, 
                                                                                    
8 While this design does not let us test for order effects, pilot experi-
ments suggested that the primary effect of experience is improved un-
derstanding of the environment, and that presenting parameter sets in 
order of strategic complexity gave the points system its “best chance”; 
because treatment transitions require a change in strategy, any “mo-
mentum” strengthens our tests. This environment does not feature pref-
erence discovery or the development of group norms that often drive 
confounding treatment order effects in experiments. 232    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Expected Landings of Each Species at the Available Locations 
Location A  B  C  D  Stay  Home 
Avg. blue  7,421  10,709  366  5,493  0 
Avg. green  2,696  2,680  1,358  9,216  0 
Avg. red  5,196  7,089  607  8,492  0 
Cost 1,800  2,200  850  2,500  0 
Exp. profit  15,888  21,664  1,633  22,923  0 
 








SET D  POINT BUDGET: 650,000 
Blue 521,000  1  1.25 
Green 567,000  5  1.00 
Red 536,000  3  1.10 
Parameters allow subjects to select location D, the 
most profitable, eight times, and stay home twice. 
If followed, relative point prices will not change. 
        
SET B  POINT BUDGET: 650,000 
Blue 721,000  3  1.25 
Green 191,800  12  1.00 
Red 480,400  5  1.10 
Parameters allow subjects to select location B eight 
times, and stay home twice. However, if subjects 
select the more myopically profitable D, they will 
draw down the TAC of green and its point price 
will spike. 
        
SET BD  POINT BUDGET: 815,000 
Blue 520,200  3  1.25 
Green 384,000  22  1.00 
Red 512,000  5  1.10 
Parameters allow subjects to select location B four 
times before the price change and D four times 
after the price change, and stay home twice. How-
ever, if some subjects ignore the point price and 
choose D, they will have fewer points and be able 
to make fewer trips when new point prices direct 
them to B. 
        
SET DB  POINT BUDGET: 650,000 
Blue 520,200  4  1.25 
Green 384,000  1  1.00 
Red 512,000  9  1.10 
Parameters allow subjects to select location D four 
times, and then B four times, and stay home twice. 
However, the initial point prices induce a derby on 
green though D. If green is chosen five times by 
everyone, green’s point prices will spike, making 
B and D unaffordable.   
a TAC listed is for 8-subject session. Nine-subject sessions scaled the TAC proportionately. 
 
 
it is necessary to develop a model of point price 
adjustment. This model will serve two research 
purposes. First, it produces predictions which can 
be used to parameterize the experimental environ-
ment, and that serve as specific hypotheses to be 
tested. Second, it provides a systematic, neutral Anderson  An Experimental Analysis of a Points-Based System for Managing Multispecies Fisheries   233 
 
 
process for determining price changes during the 
experiments, so subjects can strategize against a 
fixed (if incompletely understood) environment, 
without fear that the experimenter is arbitrarily or 
unfairly manipulating prices. The model also serves 
the practical purpose of establishing a testbed, in 
which the problem of price adjustment must 
actually be considered and implemented.
9 
  The points system proposal put forward by 
industry does not suggest how point prices might 
be adjusted; a model must be developed from 
scratch. The model used in the experiment selects 
a target harvest outcome from among those avail-
able to harvesters (i.e., an expected harvest from a 
feasible combination of location choices) and 
identifies a price that supports that outcome as an 
optimum for the harvester.
10 The first step in this 
process is to identify, for a set of market prices 
and set of available locations for each harvester, 
the set of aggregate harvests that are supportable 
by some point price vector; not all possible com-
binations of location choices can be the result of 
agents optimizing against a point price vector. 
For a given market price p, the set of possible 
outcomes is 
 
   {}
::
      max ( )     
i
ii
ii i i i x
xx x
px c x st x B i
∈∃ ρ ∈ ⎧⎫
⎪⎪ Ω=⎨⎬




where xi is the vector of i’s landings of each spe-
cies, ρ is the point price vector, ci() is i’s cost 
function, and Bi is i’s (remaining) point budget 
for the fishing season. This budget is necessary to 
induce optimization solutions that do not pursue 
the same location in every trip, as it is the inter-
action of limited time and limited points that re-
quires harvesters to develop multi-trip strategies 
to maximize their profit. Thus, Ω is the set of 
                                                                                    
9 This problem is not trivial. While the Fed worries about one price 
ratio (the price of money today to money tomorrow) with fluid money 
markets, the points system for N species requires attention to (N+1)N/2 
price ratios in an environment where not all harvest combinations may 
be feasible. 
10 A tatonnement adjustment model motivated by Scarf (1960), 
wherein prices change in proportion to excess demand, was also 
considered; although the points system is not a tatonnement pricing 
mechanism, Anderson et al. (2004) show that prices do evolve 
consistent with the predictions of Scarf’s model, even in laboratory 
institutions where disequilibrium transactions are allowed. This was 
rejected for the experiment because differential price changes may not 
have been sufficient to motivate changes in the mix of discrete 
locations chosen. 
total harvests, across all harvesters, that are sup-
portable by some point price. 
  For purposes of the experimental environment, 
Ω is constructed by evaluating a wide range of 
possible price vectors and determining the har-
vesters’ location choices (and thus expected har-
vest) for each price vector. By fixing a point 
budget and looping over a large range of point 
price vectors, the set of point prices (i.e., point 
price ratios) that support each possible expected 
harvest combination as an outcome can be estab-
lished.
11 
  When it is time to adjust the point price, the 
manager chooses a feasible harvest ω∈Ω that 
most closely matches her target for the fishery for 
that period. “Most closely” implies that the man-
ager must make trade-offs between falling under 
the TAC for some species and exceeding the TAC 
for others, using some scoring rule. In the ex-
periment, the target harvest was the TAC remain-
ing, and elements of Ω were scored by a mini-
mum squared deviation criterion, with TAC over-
ages penalized by a factor of four relative to TAC 
underages. Other criteria are possible. 
 Having  identified  ω
∗ as the most desirable of 
the feasible outcomes, the manager then chooses 
a point price vector ρ from the set of point price 
vectors that support ω
∗ as an outcome. For the 
experiment, the ρ with the highest price level for 
the scarcest species was chosen. This ρ gives one 
set of price ratios that will support the choice of 
ω
∗; however, because of the time associated with 
constructing  Ω, it was necessary to calculate it 
prior to learning the actual number of points re-
maining in the experiment, with a conjectured 
number of total points remaining. Multiplying ρ 
by the ratio of the actual number of points re-
maining to that used in constructing Ω yields 
point prices which support ω




Experiments were conducted using undergraduate 
students recruited from an email list of subjects 
who had previously expressed interest in partici-
pating in experiments, as well as from economics, 
resource economics, business statistics, and nutri-
                                                                                    
11 For some harvest combinations, the set of supporting point price 
vectors may be empty. For many combinations, the set has many ele-
ments and one must be selected. 234    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
tion courses at the University of Rhode Island. 
We collected data from seven inexperienced 
groups (three sessions of two groups, one of one 
group) and two experienced groups in the no dis-
carding treatment, and four inexperienced groups 
(two sessions of two groups) and two experienced 
groups in the discarding treatment. Subjects in 
sessions with multiple groups had their groups 
reshuffled between seasons. Experienced subject 
sessions did not control for the treatment in which 




Figures 2a and 2b show the distribution of loca-
tion choices for subjects in the first five days of 
the no discarding and discarding treatments. Each 
figure shows eight bars arranged in four pairs. 
Each pair corresponds to a parameter set; the left 
bar within the pair is data from the inexperienced 
subject sessions (aggregating the two seasons of 
each parameter set within each session; differ-
ences are negligible), and the right bar is experi-
enced sessions. 
  Looking at the data in all parameter sets, there 
are two key observations regarding location 
choice. First, incentives are an important driver of 
location choice, as the most profitable locations—
B and D—are the most frequently chosen, and 
“Stay Home” and C (which yield little or no 
profit) are rarely chosen. Second, while the ex 
ante optimal strategy in each parameter set in-
volves repeated selection of a specific location in 
at least four of the first five periods, no single 
location dominates the choices in any parameter 
set, even among experienced subjects; the data 
are noisy. This variability arises as individual sub-
jects select different locations on different days 
within this challenging environment. 
  Despite the noise, there are observable differ-
ences in location choices among the parameter 
sets. Initial choice patterns in sets B and D are 
similar, with an emphasis on location B, which is 
even more prevalent among experienced subjects. 
This reflects a suboptimal response to the differ-
ence in TACs between the two parameter sets: in 
set D, green will be under-harvested and the rela-
tive point prices of red and blue will likely spike 
after day 5; in set B, green will be relatively over-
harvested (because B constitutes only about half 
of choices) and its point price will spike after day 
5. Between BD and DB, however, there is a 
marked shift from B to D in response to the low 
initial point price of green. With discarding, sub-
jects are less likely to choose “Stay Home,” and 
experienced subjects are less likely to choose 
low-intensity location A. 
  Figures 3a–3d show how much of each species 
was caught relative to the TAC, and when. Fig-
ures 3a and 3b show four sets of three bars, each 
associated with a parameter set. The bars reflect 
the total harvest and TAC, aggregated across all 
sessions.
12 The left bar in each set represents the 
blue fish (labeled with a B); the middle bar (la-
beled with G), green fish; and the right bar (la-
beled with R), red fish. Within each bar, the black 
segment indicates the amount of that fish caught 
in the first five days, before the price change, and 
the gray indicates the amount of that fish har-
vested after the price change. If total harvest is 
less than the total TAC,
13 the residual TAC is indi-
cated by a white segment; if the total harvest ex-
ceeds the TAC, the overage is indicated by a 
crosshatched segment. 
  Comparing harvest patterns between parameter 
sets, the first five days’ harvests are similar in 
parameter sets D and B, reflecting the similar dis-
tributions of location choices seen in Figures 2a 
and 2b. However, the revised point prices did 
lead to differential harvests, as harvests in set D 
reflect high levels of effort on all three species—
likely through more intensive use of location D—
and harvests in set B draw on proportionately less 
green—likely through more intensive use of lo-
cation B. However, the non-optimal choices dur-
ing the first five periods do prevent subjects from 
exhausting the TACs of all three species, leaving 
considerable green in set D and considerable blue 
in set B. 
  The more intensive use of location D in the 
first five days of set DB rather than BD can be 
seen in the amount of green fish harvested. How-
ever, the point price revision redirected effort 
successfully in both cases, and in both sets sub- 
                                                                                    
12 This means that one group could exceed the TAC, but another 
leave a larger amount of TAC remaining, and it would be reflected as 
an aggregate underage. 
13 A file buffer error in the software prevented the recording of some 
subjects’ data in the final day of some seasons. Absent information on 
this effort, the TAC used in the analysis is prorated to the data avail-













Figure 3a. Total Harvests Without Discarding 
 
 
Figure 3b. Total Harvests Without Discarding (Experienced) 
 
 
jects harvested a very significant portion of the 
TAC of all three species, with minimal overage. 
  Figures 3c and 3d have an additional layer of 
complexity to represent discarding. To the previ-
ous solid bars, slashed segments have been added 
to reflect discarded fish: black rising slashes indi-
cate discarding during the first five days that still 




Figure 3c. Total Harvests with Discarding 
 
 
Figure 3d. Total Harvests with Discarding (Experienced) 
 
discarding during days six to ten that fell within 
the TAC; black falling slashes indicate discarding 
during the first five days that would have ex-
ceeded the TAC had it been landed; and gray fal-
ling slashes indicate discarding during days six to 
ten that would have exceeded the TAC had it been 
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  Perhaps surprisingly, discarding behavior rep-
resented in Figure 3c reflects a relatively small 
impact of discarding on stocks: while discarding 
of most species happens, it is often still within the 
bounds of the TAC. The blue TAC is exceeded by 
landings alone in parameter set D and BD, just as 
when discarding was impossible. However, dis-
carding leads to exceeding the TAC in green and 
(inexperienced) red in set B, and in blue and red 
in set DB. Interestingly, in set B there is consid-
erable discarding during the first five days of the 
season, perhaps because point prices were so 
high, but subjects wound up landing a lot less 
green than in the no discarding treatment. 
  The point prices in Table 2 drive location 
choices for the first five days of every session, 
but the second five days’ prices are determined 
by the price change algorithm and harvests during 
the first five days. Figure 4 shows the distribution 
of changed prices, as price ratios with Red=1; the 
discarding treatment is indicated by hollow mark-
ers, though their distribution is largely similar to 
that of the no discarding treatment. The figure 
shows that parameter set B often has revised prices 
where green’s price is relatively high, steering 
subjects more strongly toward location B from 
location D. The DB parameter set appears to have 
mostly lower price ratios, where all species have 
similar prices. The other treatments have new 
prices where green is some multiple of red (up to 
eight times), and blue is some slightly higher 
multiple. 
  The next sections use statistical models to es-
tablish how point prices affect location choices, 
whether incorrect pricing induces derbies on un-
derpriced species, and whether the discarding op-
portunity influenced location choices. 
 
Point Prices Affect Location Choices 
 
Table 3 presents estimates of a multinomial logit 
model of the choice of location during the first 
five fishing days in each season, when the point 
prices are determined by the parameter set. In this 
model, the base location is D, the myopic profit-
maximizing location. Thus, a positive coefficient 
reflects that an increase in a variable will make 
subjects more likely to choose the indicated loca-
tion than location D. The point price variables 
Green Points and Blue Points are normalized—
setting the point price of red fish to 1—because 
price levels vary to reflect the total available 
points, both at the beginning of the season and at 
the point price change; these magnitudes should 
not be a primary driver of location choice. 
  The first two lines of Table 3 indicate that loca-
tion choice probabilities are highly significantly 
affected by point prices, with seven of the eight 
coefficients significant, six highly so. In particu-
lar, significant negative coefficients on Blue Points 
means subjects are much more likely to choose 
location D when the relative point price of blue is 
high, especially relative to location B (p<10
-15). 
When the relative point price of green is high, 
subjects become much less likely to choose loca-
tion D, preferring instead to choose B (p<10
-6), 
A, or “Stay Home.” Thus, when the relative point 
price of a species is high, subjects reassess the 
value of the locations where that species is abun-
dant, and select other locations. 
  That other parameter set and treatment vari-
ables are significant in addition to prices suggests 
that choice patterns are also consistent with dy-
namic strategies that indicate that subjects are 
looking at more than just prices. That is, subjects 
are anticipating the price change, and their future 
harvest opportunities under the TAC, in picking 
their locations. The parameter set primary effects 
in the second section of Table 3 capture location 
choice in the first five days. The significantly 
positive coefficients indicate that subjects are 
much more likely to pick locations other than D 
in parameter sets B and BD, when green fish is 
limited. After the point price change (captured by 
the Day>5 interactions), negative coefficients re-
flect that subjects shift significantly toward loca-
tion D from locations A and B in parameter sets 
D and B, reflecting that there is ample TAC avail-
able. The significant effects in parameter set DB 




Parameter set DB was designed to test the effects 
of a derby on a fish species induced by prices that 
were temporarily too low. A chi-squared test com-
paring the distribution of location choices indi-
cates that the distribution of location choices in 
parameter set BD is significantly different from 
that in set DB, despite their identical TACs 
(p <10
-10 for inexperienced subjects, and p <10
-13 
























switching from choosing location B in set BD to 
location D in set DB, a relative “derby” on green 
fish in the first five days of parameter set DB. 
  Controlling for prices and treatment effects, the 
model in Table 3 indicates that locations B 
(p <10
-3) and C (p =0.079) are significantly less 
likely to be chosen than derby location D in the 
first five days of set DB. This means that subjects 
are opportunistically pursuing the underpriced 
green fish abundant in location D. This indicates 
that the subjects are choosing to pursue the un-
derpriced green fish due to parameter-set–specific 
reasons beyond what can be explained by the 
relative prices alone. 
  However, it is important to note that, while 
there was derby fishing in the first five days of 
the fishing season in set DB, the TAC was not 
badly exceeded. Instead, the adjustment in point 
prices directed choices toward location B (p  < 
10
-8), for a net positive effect of 0.45 in the last 
five days, leading to a lower harvest of green fish. 
Thus, the points system does have a degree of 
flexibility to recover from initial pricing mistakes. 
Discarding 
 
Figures 2a and 2b suggest that the distribution of 
location choices did not dramatically change in 
most parameter sets between the discarding and 
no discarding treatments. Pooling observations in 
the first five days for each discarding treatment 
indicates that discarding did not affect choices in 
parameter set B (chi-squared p =0.562 for inex-
perienced subjects, p =0.131 for experienced) or 
in set BD (p =0.166 for inexperienced subjects, 
p =0.276 for experienced). In parameter set D, 
experienced subjects did significantly shift their 
effort toward location B in the discarding treat-
ment (p =0.001), perhaps hoping to save points 
for more trips with lower harvests of green fish, 
but inexperienced subjects did not (p =0.468). 
  The opportunity to discard affected choices of 
both experienced and inexperienced subjects in 
derby treatment DB, though they reacted differ-
ently. Inexperienced subjects (chi-square p <0.001) 
shifted effort from location D to location B with 
discarding. Experienced subjects (p <10
-4) shifted 240    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 3. Multinomial Logit Model of (Normalized) Price and Parameter Set Effects on Location 
Choice 
  A  B  C  Stay Home 
Location  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Blue Points  -0.10**  0.021  -0.17**  0.020  -0.06**  0.024  -0.04*  0.022 
Green Points  0.08**  0.023  0.10**  0.023  0.01  0.025  0.08**  0.029 
Set B  0.47**  0.158  0.23  0.179  0.56**  0.235  1.11**  0.357 
Set BD  0.33**  0.134  0.26*  0.139  -0.12  0.245  1.56**  0.395 
Set DB  -0.14  0.175  -0.63**  0.191  -0.39*  0.224  1.00**  0.440 
Day > 5  -0.72**  0.195  -0.98**  0.175  -0.35*  0.208  0.49  0.401 
(Day > 5) × B  -0.90*  0.474  -0.77**  0.386  0.35  0.486  0.16  0.699 
(Day > 5) × BD  -0.27  0.213  0.06  0.211  0.11  0.334  0.21  0.212 
(Day > 5) × DB  0.17  0.200  1.08**  0.203  0.40  0.271  0.40  0.401 
Discard  0.13  0.224  0.36**  0.195  0.11  0.263  -0.62**  0.240 
Discard × B  -0.27  0.264  -0.17  0.229  -0.66*  0.338  -0.78*  0.407 
Discard × BD  -0.51**  0.243  -0.33*  0.182  -0.42  0.341  -0.63**  0.312 
Discard × DB  -0.67**  0.253  -0.66**  0.236  -0.54  0.365  -0.50  0.347 
Experience  0.20  0.239  0.36**  0.167  -0.36  0.247  0.61**  0.168 
Constant  -0.19  0.160  0.61**  0.146  -1.02**  0.183  -2.63**  0.409 




effort from locations A and “Stay Home” in the no 
discarding treatment toward location B in the dis-
carding treatment. This may reflect an evolution 
of strategy because, while the green fish caught in 
D can be discarded, location B offers more of the 
other species that can be landed and sold. 
  The logit model in Table 3 also indicates there 
is some effect of the discarding treatment in pa-
rameter sets BD and DB. In the derby-inducing 
parameter set DB, subjects do target underpriced 
green fish more aggressively in the discarding 
treatment, as they are even more unlikely to select 
location B (p =0.006) (and A and C) than loca-
tion D in the non-discarding treatment. Increased 
pursuit of the constrained green fish could reflect 
a decreased fear of high point prices of green 
after the point price change, since they could be 
discarded, but actual discarding of green is lower 
in DB than parameter sets B or BD. In the first 
five periods of parameter set BD, the significantly 
negative difference between locations B and D 
(-0.33) offsets the significantly positive interac-
tion with the parameter set primary effect (0.26), 
leaving little net effect; the probability of select-
ing B is not distinct from the probability of se-
lecting D in parameter set BD with discarding. In 
fact, the primary effect of the discarding treat-
ment indicates the probability that picking loca-
tion B is significantly higher than in the non-dis-
carding treatment (p =0.058). 
  Table 4 assesses the factors that contribute to 
discarding each species of fish. It presents esti-
mates from three separate random effects logit 
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Table 4. Random Effects Logit Models of the Decision to Discard Each Species (when not forced) 
  Blue  Green  Red 
Species  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Blue Points  0.30**  0.063  0.04  0.042  0.12**  0.052 
Green Points  -0.18**  0.084  0.01  0.053  0.00  0.068 
Blue π/point  0.22  0.502  0.43  0.302  1.01**  0.384 
Green π/point  -3.67**  1.190  -2.41**  1.069  2.40**  1.028 
Red π/point  -0.68**  0.237  -0.29  0.229  -0.58**  0.227 
Ln(Points Left)  -0.52**  0.079  -0.33**  0.066  -0.46**  0.073 
Set B  -0.11  0.507  1.13**  0.356  1.02**  0.421 
Set BD  -0.69  0.614  0.36  0.411  0.02  0.521 
Set DB  2.55**  1.113  0.57  0.900  0.45  0.880 
Day > 5  0.20  0.494  -0.24  0.333  0.26  0.406 
(Day > 5) × B  2.18**  0.880  -0.83  0.600  -1.49**  0.719 
(Day > 5) × BD  -0.18  0.695  -1.47**  0.510  -0.90  0.641 
(Day > 5) × DB  -2.56**  1.048  -0.78  0.852  -1.17  0.855 
Experience  -1.29**  0.641  -1.33**  0.552  -2.77**  0.678 
Experience × B  -0.37  0.526  -0.30  0.325  0.00  0.618 
Experience × BD  0.21  0.453  1.39**  0.325  1.31**  0.580 
Experience × DB  -0.11  0.426  -0.46  0.452  2.08**  0.476 
Constant  5.24**  1.210  3.20**  1.037  2.66**  1.115 
N 2866    2801    3178   
lnL -818.38    -1245.97    -1063.48  
Chi-Sq 204.70    273.14    309.59   
Note: ** denotes coefficients with p < 0.05, and * denotes p < 0.10. 
 
 
subjects decide to discard at least one pound of 
their catch of each species. The models focus on 
strategic discarding, and exclude observations 
where a subject must discard to have sufficient 
points to cover her landings. There are two fac-
tors that significantly affect all three species: 
having more points left, as reflected by Ln(points 
left), makes subjects significantly less likely to 
discard; and having experience makes subjects 
less likely to discard, perhaps reflecting that sub-
jects learn that much of their discarding is un-
necessary. 
 The  Blue Points and Green Points variables are 
relative normalized point prices (Red Points=1), 
and each species’ π/point (profit per point) 
reflects how point prices affect the probability of 
discarding. Each species has some combination of 
these variables significant, indicating that subjects 
are responsive to prices and profit per point, but 
the relationships are complex and linked through 
the joint harvest relationships in the locations tar-
geted, making aggregate effects difficult to inter-
pret. That is, it is not feasible for subjects to de-
cide they will discard all non-green fish because 
the limited days in the fishing season will not 
allow them to go fishing enough to spend all their 
points on only green fish; thus they keep some of 
the other species they catch. Which of the differ-
ent species are optimal depends on the relative 
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they plan to fish. Blue is more likely to be dis-
carded when its point price is high (p<10
-7)—a 
sensible direct effect—but other direct effects are 
not significant. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Looking across parameter sets, discarding treat-
ments, and experience levels, experimental sub-
jects are broadly responsive to point prices in 
both their location and discarding decisions. The 
data are noisy, and there is considerable variation 
in locations selected—and observations of domi-
nated locations—even in treatments where none 
is predicted, but there are strong indications that a 
points system could be used to affect harvester 
behavior. First, the noise in the data is considera-
bly reduced in the experienced subject sessions, 
which may more closely reflect behavior in the 
field where actual harvesters are more familiar 
with the harvesting options (location, depth, gear, 
etc.) available in their fisheries than are subjects 
thrust into a new dynamic environment. Second, 
despite the noise, the comparative statics predic-
tions of the points system model are supported—
when a species’ relative point price increases, 
harvesters change behavior to avoid it—indicat-
ing that even inexperienced subjects are re-
sponding to the point prices, as well as market 
prices. Third, even with the somewhat noisy be-
havior, much of the TAC of each species is har-
vested, with only modest amounts of overage in 
all parameter sets and treatments. Collectively, 
this suggests that a points-based system could be 
used to effectively manage multispecies fisheries 
to acceptable biological and economic outcomes. 
  While subjects are responsive to point prices, 
there are several practical issues associated with 
establishing those prices that will be critical to the 
successful implementation of a points system. 
The first is what happens when point prices are 
set incorrectly—a species has its point price set 
too high or too low—and harvesters respond to 
those prices, especially if they do so in a dynami-
cally sensitive manner that reflects effort to har-
vest a species at low point prices before the prices 
increase. The experimental data in parameter set 
DB suggest that this does happen: subjects pursue 
the underpriced species at a greater rate. How-
ever, the “derby” observed in the experiment also 
revealed some of the flexibility of the points sys-
tem: it did not result in badly exceeding the TAC 
for the targeted species, or severe underages of 
other species. The reason for this is that when the 
points were adjusted, the new prices were able to 
steer harvesters away from the initially over-
harvested fish. Two adjustments took place. First, 
the point price of the over-harvested fish went up, 
making it a less good use of points, so harvesters 
went elsewhere. Second, the price level went up, 
so harvesters were not able to harvest more fish 
because they had spent fewer points than 
expected on the underpriced species. Of course, 
this sort of flexibility requires that point prices be 
adjusted at regular enough intervals, and with 
sufficient precision, that the TAC is not exceeded 
during the initial derby, or the derby causes 
profitable joint harvesting to be prohibitively 
point-intensive. 
  The second issue is what happens when point 
prices become an imperfect management instru-
ment because harvesters may avoid the point 
price cost associated with landing a species be-
cause they discard it. Indeed, the experimental re-
sults support the hypothesis that point price is a 
significant driver of the voluntary discarding de-
cision. However, it is more difficult to extend this 
result directly to the field than it is the others, and 
thus ascertaining its implications is not straight-
forward. First, subjects had a fundamentally dif-
ferent relationship with the laboratory fish stock 
than harvesters do with their stocks; the com-
plexity of the field is impossible to implement in 
the lab. However, neutrally framing the discard-
ing decision in the lab places an upper bound on 
the discarding activity observed: in the lab, dis-
carding was a purely economic or strategic deci-
sion, and any long-term stock health concerns, 
moral qualms, or fears of legal or social enforce-
ment that real harvesters might have would at-
tenuate discarding activity. Second, that a positive 
amount of discarding occurs is not necessarily the 
appropriate observation, since status quo and other 
proposed management strategies also have incen-
tives (or explicit requirements) for discarding. The 
more important question is whether the points 
system leads to more or less discarding than alter-
native management systems. The experiments sug-
gest that several factors may affect the decision to 
discard, including point prices but also the nature Anderson  An Experimental Analysis of a Points-Based System for Managing Multispecies Fisheries   243 
 
 
of joint harvesting, the relative TACs of jointly 
harvested species, and whether other species offer 
greater profit per point. 
  A final practical issue encountered during the 
development of this experiment—and which may 
be prohibitive for a points system—is how to 
determine adjusted prices in the field. The re-
sponsiveness of subjects to the point prices indi-
cates that not just stock levels, but also economic 
factors (i.e., profitability) must be considered in 
assessing the attractiveness of different species, 
and thus stock levels alone cannot determine 
point prices. In addition, the joint harvesting rela-
tionships among stocks mean that stocks cannot 
necessarily be considered independently. The 
limited number of harvest locations inspired the 
discrete approach taken by the price adjustment 
algorithm developed for the experiment. To the 
extent that this accurately characterizes the fish-
ery, a discrete approach could be adopted for the 
field, though it may be prohibitive to characterize 
all harvest combinations and perform an optimi-
zation among them. This suggests adopting a dif-
ferential tatonnement approach, and it may be that 
there is sufficient heterogeneity in available loca-
tions and vessels within the whole fishery to gen-
erate a behavioral response to any modest change 
in point prices. However, managers should be 
cautioned that if a differential approach is adopted, 
but there are in fact a small number of distinct 
harvesting strategies, then small price changes 
may not induce any change in behavior, and with-
out a high level of information about the busi-
nesses and their harvest strategies, it may be dif-
ficult to determine the level of point price change 
necessary to induce the desired shift in effort 
across species. 
  The “derby treatment” of the experiment indi-
cates that harvesters will respond to incorrect 
point prices; it also suggests that the system can 
be robust to them, if it can make compensating 
point price adjustments in time. This means that it 
may be possible to achieve management goals 
with an imperfect pricing algorithm. What “in 
time” means varies with the TAC levels and de-
gree of joint harvesting associated with the mis-
priced stock, but for a fishery with several se-
verely depressed stocks, it is likely to be more 
than a few times a season; the guiding principle is 
to be able to correct prices before the derby badly 
constrains future joint harvesting with the mis-
priced species. 
  While this study was being conducted, another 
management system emerged as a leading con-
tender in the New England Fishery Management 
Council. In this system—sector allocation—har-
vesters would be allowed to form voluntary mem-
bership groups, or sectors, that would be respon-
sible for managing the members’ collective quota 
allocation, which is based on each members’ 
landings history and days-at-sea allocation. These 
sectors would have considerable flexibility in 
managing their quota allocations, and it is likely 
that different sectors would emerge around dif-
ferent preferred management systems of the 
member harvesters. Such a sector might be the 
most sensible venue for implementing a version 
of the points system. The sector would be exempt 
from regulation change notification limits that 
would constrain how often point prices could be 
updated if the points system were to be adopted 
fishery-wide, and thus a sector could regularly 
adjust point prices, compensating for what is 
likely to be an imperfect point price adjustment 
algorithm. Further, a sector might have better in-
formation about its harvesters’ harvest options, 
and thus be able to better predict responses to 
point price changes, and have better social moni-
toring and sanctioning mechanisms to limit dis-
carding. While some of the challenges associated 
with understanding the joint harvesting relation-
ships and adjusting point prices would still need 
to be addressed, a points system may be feasible 
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